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Abstract 
This study examines the relationship between country-level non-performing loans (NPLs) and financial 
development. In the full country analysis, the findings indicate that financial development measured as private 
credit to GDP ratio is positively associated with NPLs. Also, NPLs are inversely associated with bank efficiency, 
loan loss coverage, banking competition and banking system stability; and is positively associated with foreign 
bank presence, banking crises and bank concentration. We also find that efficient and stable banking sectors 
experience higher NPLs. In the regional analysis, NPLs are observed to be negatively associated with regulatory 
capital and bank liquidity while the graphical analysis show that NPLs are inversely related to financial 
development and profitability across regions. The findings have implications. 
JEL Classification Code: E44, G01, G21, G28, G32, F34, O16 
Keywords: Non-performing loans; financial development; banking crisis; foreign banks; financial 
intermediation; credit risk 
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1. Introduction 
Non-performing loans reflect the credit quality of the loan portfolio of banks, and in aggregate terms, reflect the 
credit quality of the loan portfolio of the banking sector of a country or region. For most countries, aggregate 
non-performing loans were relatively low prior to the 2008 global financial crisis but increased significantly 
during and after the 2008 financial crisis
1
, compelling bank supervisors/regulators in several countries to 
intervene to deal with the rising non-performing loans in the banking sector. Despite the formulation of several 
policy design intended to mitigate recessionary economic trends that give rise to non-performing loans as well 
as the imposition of different levels of stringent capital requirements for banks to mitigate risk-taking that 
increase the risk of non-performing loans in several countries around the world, yet rising non-performing loans 
remain a major issue which raises serious concern about whether existing policy and regulatory initiatives by 
bank regulators/supervisors are adequate to mitigate rising non-performing loans. 
In this paper, we partly deviate from the macroeconomic argument for non-performing loans and take a different 
view, which is this: given that non-performing loans are a measure of bank performance (i.e., the lower, the 
better), could it be that certain financial (sector) development characteristics makes it more probable for the 
banking sector to experience higher or fewer aggregate non-performing loans? We are interested in explaining 
this relationship, if any, using country-level data for non-performing loans. Therefore, we investigate the 
empirical association between non-performing loans and financial development using two datasets: data for 96 
countries and data for 6 regions of the world. We use non-traditional NPL indicators to control for bank-level 
determinants of non-performing loans. Our measures of financial development are private credit by banks to 
GDP ratio and bank deposit to GDP ratio, and we find that non-performing loans are positively associated with 
financial development measured as private credit by banks to GDP ratio, implying that banking sectors with 
greater financial development (via greater financial intermediation) have higher non-performing loans. 
This study contributes to the literature on the determinants of NPLs and macro-financial feedback in two ways. 
One, we focus on the relationship between non-performing loans and financial sector development, an issue that 
remain unexplored in the extant literature. Two, we use two datasets and combine regional graphical analysis 
and global empirical analysis to examine the association between NPLs and financial development during the 
2003 to 2014 period. Three, we introduce non-traditional banking sector determinants that potentially explain 
the behaviour of non-performing loans.  
From a policy standpoint, our analysis is of interest to policy makers for two reasons. First, our analysis on the 
relationship between aggregate non-performing loans and financial development is crucial for macro-prudential 
surveillance and can help policy makers in their evaluation of external factors beyond their control that 
influence the level of aggregate non-performing loans despite their micro-prudential policy efforts to reduce the 
size of NPLs. A thorough understanding of this relationship can provide some breakthrough to bank 
supervisors/regulators in their attempt to identify the causes of rising non-performing loans and how to reduce 
non-performing loans in the banking sector. Finally, our analysis is relevant for the stress testing of bank loan 
quality. National bank supervisors should take into account the level of financial sector development in their 
                                                          
1 See Appendix A1. 
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stress-test scenarios in order to gain robust stress test results to improve their understanding of what gives rise to 
non-performing loans in the banking sector.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework and the 
literature review on non-performing loans. Section 3 presents a description of the dataset and the econometric 
methodology used to estimate the relationship between NPLs and financial development. Section 4 discusses the 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework and Related Literature 
2.1. Non-Performing Loans 
NPL is an indicator of banks’ asset quality, and asset quality is an important indicator of the performance of the 
banking sector of a country amongst other performance indicators. In aggregate terms, the asset quality of a 
country’s banking sector is determined by its aggregate non-performing loan measured as the ratio of impaired 
loans to gross loans; however, the definition of non-performing loans will differ across countries
2
. The level of 
non-performing loans is of serious concern to bank regulators/supervisors due to its role in the failure of several 
systemic and non-systemic financial institutions around the world particularly during the 2007 to 2008 financial 
crisis. A closer look at aggregate NPLs across regions confirm that the post-2008 financial crisis era witnessed a 
significant increase in aggregate NPLs in several regions (See Figure 1) and several banking analysts expect the 
level of non-performing loans to increase in subsequent years. While micro-level attempts by bank 
regulators/supervisors to reduce the level of aggregate non-performing loans may involve minimising the level 
of non-performing loans for individual banks in the country, we also take into account that certain financial (or 
banking sector) development characteristics/structures in a country can increase or reduce the likelihood of non-
performing loans. As can be seen in Figure 2, the graphical analysis below, using regional data, show some 
association between non-performing loans and financial sector development indicators. As can be observed in 
Figure 2 to 7, NPLs are inversely related to financial intermediation (private credit to GDP ratio) and size of the 
banking sector (bank deposits to GDP ratio) for the World, SSA, MENA, LAC and EAP regions while a 
positive association is observed for the ECA region in the post-crisis period.  For all regions, NPLs are inversely 
related to return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA). Subsequently, we empirically test this observed 
association to determine whether varying cross-country financial sector development indicators affect the level 
of aggregate non-performing loans.  
 
 
 
                                                          
2 see 2012 report on NPLs by the European Banking Coordination “Vienna” Initiative .Available at: http://vienna-
initiative.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Full-Forum-Meeting-of-the-European-Bank-Coordination-Vienna-2.0-
Initative.pdf 
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Figure 1: Non-performing loans (by region) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
World Bank Statistics 
World
Sub-Saharan Africa (developing only)
Middle East & North Africa (developing only)
Latin America & Caribbean (developing only)
Europe & Central Asia (developing only)
East Asia & Pacific (developing only)
6 
 
Figure 2: World 
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Figure 3: Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region 
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Figure 4: Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 
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Figure 5: Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region 
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Figure 6: Europe & Central Asia (EAC) region 
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Figure 7: East Asia & Pacific (EAP) region 
 
 
 
2.2. Related Literature 
The literature on non-performing loans (NPLs) focus extensively on the macroeconomic and bank-level 
determinants of non-performing loans with little or no focus on the question whether certain financial 
development influence the level of non-performing loans. For instance, Nkusu (2011) investigate the 
determinants of non-performing loans across 26 developed countries over the 1998 to 2009 period and find that 
deteriorating macroeconomic conditions such as: economic growth and higher unemployment led to higher non-
performing loans. Klein (2013), using country-level data, investigate 16 CESEE countries over the1998 to 2011 
period and find that aggregate NPLs are negatively associated with credit growth, unemployment, gross 
domestic product growth rate and inflation. Louzis et al (2012) investigate the determinants of non-performing 
loans (NPLs) in the Greek banking sector for each loan category: consumer loans, business loans and mortgages, 
and find that non-performing loans are significantly influenced by management quality, GDP, unemployment, 
interest rates and public debt. Skarica (2014), using country-level non-performing loans data, investigate the 
determinants of non-performing loans among 7 countries in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region 
during the third-quarters of 2007 and 2012 and find that higher non-performing loans are significantly 
associated with economic slowdown, unemployment and inflation. Beck et al (2015) examine the 
macroeconomic determinants of non-performing loans (NPLs) across 91 countries and find that non-performing 
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loans are significantly affected by real GDP growth, share prices, exchange rate and lending interest rate. 
Anastasiou et al (2016) focus on the Euro-area banking system during the 1990 to 2015 period, and find that 
income tax and output gap significantly influence NPLs.  
In the literature, GDP growth rate is considered to negatively correlate with higher NPLs because NPLs tend to 
be lower during economic boom and are higher during recessionary periods (see, Skarica, 2014; Ozili, 2015; 
Beck et al, 2015; etc.). Also, higher unemployment is associated with higher non-performing loans because high 
unemployment levels lower borrowers’ capacity to repay loans (Klein, 2013; Nkusu, 2011), while the effect of 
inflation on non-performing loans is inconclusive in the literature (see, Klein, 2013; Beck et al, 2015, etc.). 
Global risk-factors may also drive the level of non-performing loans. Espinoza and Prasad (2013) investigate 80 
banks from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region, and employ the VIX proxy to control for global 
financial volatility and risk aversion. They find that non-performing loans are positively correlated with greater 
global financial volatility, implying that non-performing loans increases with global risk. 
With regard to bank-level determinants, Klein (2013) finds that capital adequacy measured as equity-to-asset 
ratio is negatively correlated with NPLs, implying that banks with relatively low capital have incentives to 
engage in risky lending behaviour which increases the incidence of non-performing loans while Boudriga et al 
(2009) investigate the cross-country determinants of nonperforming loans (NPLs) while controlling for banking 
supervisory and institutional factors on credit risk exposure. They show that banking sectors with higher capital 
adequacy ratios and prudent loan loss provisioning report fewer non-performing loans. Additionally, Klein 
(2013) shows that profitable banks have fewer NPLs because lower NPLs leads to higher interest income which 
subsequently improves overall profitability. 
Moreover, because non-performing is measure of bank performance, the literature that examine the relationship 
between firm/bank performance and financial development is rather scant. One study, Tanaskovic and Jandric 
(2015) use private credit to GDP ratio to control for financial sector development while investigating the 
macroeconomic and institutional determinants of NPLs for some countries in Central, Eastern and South-
Eastern Europe (CESEE) during the 2006 to 2013 period. They find that NPL is negatively correlated with GDP 
and financial sector development, and positively associated with foreign currency loans ratio and exchange rate. 
Another study Giannetti and Ongena (2009) show that foreign firms are more inclined to fund low-risk 
borrowers that have promising projects rather than fund unpromising projects belonging to high-risk and well-
connected or state-owned firms, and lending to low-risk borrowers with promising projects will reduce the risk 
of non-performing loans thus improving the asset quality of the firm. However, they did not examine the case of 
non-performing loans. Following their reasoning, one would expect that countries whose banking sectors are 
dominated by greater foreign bank assets may experience fewer aggregate non-performing loans. Accordingly, 
we control for foreign bank presence in our analysis to test this claim.  
Foreign bank presence reflects financial development via financial liberalisation and can have some impact on 
non-performing loans. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) investigate the relationship between financial 
development and structure on bank performance using bank-level data for developed and developing countries 
during 1990-1997 period, and show that greater financial sector development is associated with lower 
profitability for banks reflecting increased efficiency due to increased competition. However, Demirguc-Kunt  
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and Huizinga (2000) did not examine the case of non-performing loans. In contrast, our study is different 
because we take a shift from the extant literature to investigate more directly the relationship between non-
performing loans and financial (sector) development while controlling for traditional and non-traditional 
determinants of non-performing loans.  
Finally, we did not control separately for macroeconomic factors because we expect causality and/or high 
correlation between financial development and macroeconomic indicators as indicated by Levine (1997), rather 
we deflated the financial development indicators by GDP, a macroeconomic indicator.  To this end, our analysis 
in this paper can be viewed as an attempt to examine the relationship between financial development and bank 
performance, taking non-performing loans as a measure of bank performance. 
 
3. Data and Method 
3.1. Data 
The data is obtained from the global financial development indicator archived in the World Bank database. We 
obtain two datasets. First, we obtain country-level data for 134 countries over the 2003 to 2014 period. Second, 
we obtain data for 6 regions over the same sample period: the six (6) regions are: World, Sub-Saharan Africa 
(developing countries only), Middle East and North Africa (developing countries only), Latin America and 
Caribbean (developing countries only), Europe and Central Asia (developing countries only) and East Asian and 
pacific (developing countries only) regions.  
We separate these two datasets to avoid double counting from the first category so that no country is included 
twice in the analysis. In the first dataset, some countries did not report data for aggregate non-performing loans. 
Of the 134 countries, 38 countries did not report data for non-performing loans and we exclude these countries 
from the analysis which reduces the sample to a final sample of 96 banks with available data; however, the final 
data distribution also include countries with missing NPL values for some years, implying that the data 
distribution is an unbalanced panel. See Appendix A3 for variable description. The summary of the descriptive 
statistics show that the full country-sample NPL mean and World NPL mean are approximately the same in 
Panel A and B. Panel B shows that the level of financial development (PGDP and DGDP) is relatively low in 
Sub-Saharan Africa compared to other regions.  
Panel A: First-Sample Summary of Descriptive statistics 
All ratios are expressed in percentages for expositional convenience.   
 CI LD NII CAR NPL LLC DGDP PGDP CRISIS BCON ZSCORE FOREIGN LERNER 
 Mean  54.9  104.8  35.9  15.8  6.3  70.4  62.1  60.1  0.1  69.7  11.4  38.1  0.3 
 Median  54.9  89.4  34.6  15.1  3.7  60.2  47.8  47.2  0.0  69.3  9.4  27.0  0.3 
 Maximum  218.1  879.7  80.0  43.4  45.3  322.1  479.7  262.5  1.0  100.0  41.8  100.0  0.9 
 Minimum  0.0  17.7  0.0  1.8  0.1  0.0  6.10  2.0  0.0  23.4 -12.6  0.0 -1.6 
 Std. Dev.  14.9  77.3  12.3  4.6  6.6  42.7  57.4  47.6  0.3  18.8  8.0  32.1  0.1 
 Observations  1128  1108  1127  1005  994  924  1105  1117  864  1062  1131  796  921 
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Panel B: Second-Sample Summary of Descriptive statistics (Regional) 
 CI LD NII CAR NPL LLC DGDP PGDP ZSCORE LERNER 
Regions mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean 
SSA 58.44 69.49 43.86 16.19 7.63 52.1 19.145 15.72 7.77 0.29 
MENA 47.36 38.70 31.15 13.95 12.3 65.27 53.51 28.93 19.50 0.32 
LAC 61.98 87.46 30.05 15.22 3.46 121.43 38.72 31.59 13.61 0.25 
ECA 56.58 108.10 36.44 19.68 7.43 61.82 30.10 28.72 6.31 0.27 
EAP 48.13 82.05 30.14 15.69 5.81 52.19 38.36 33.10 9.89 0.32 
World 55.04 83.89 36.35 15.34 4.00 64.77 40.28 33.93 9.82 0.28 
SSA = Sub-Saharan African. MENA = Middle East and North Africa. LAC = Latin America and 
Caribbean. ECA = Europe and Central Asia. EAP = East Asian and Pacific. All regional data for 2003 to 
2014 is available from Global Financial Development indicators at World Bank Database. All ratios are 
expressed in percentages for expositional convenience.   
 
3.2. Methodology 
To investigate the association between non-performing loans and financial development indicators, we estimate 
the following models. 
𝑁𝑃𝐿 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐶𝐼 +  𝛽2 𝐿𝐷 +  𝛽3 𝑁𝐼𝐼 +  𝛽4 𝐶𝐴𝑅 +  𝛽5 𝐿𝐿𝐶 +  𝛽6 𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽7 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽8 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 
+  𝛽9 𝐵𝐶𝑂𝑁 +  𝛽10 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 +  𝛽11 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 +  𝛽12 𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑅 
+  𝑒                                                                 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (1) 
𝑁𝑃𝐿 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐶𝐼 +  𝛽2 𝐿𝐷 +  𝛽3 𝑁𝐼𝐼 +  𝛽4 𝐶𝐴𝑅 +  𝛽5 𝐿𝐿𝐶 +  𝛽6 𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽7 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽8 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 
+  𝛽9 𝐵𝐶𝑂𝑁 +  𝛽10 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 +  𝛽11 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 +  𝛽12 𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑅 +  𝛽13 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃 ∗ 𝐿𝐷 
+  𝛽14 𝐶𝐼 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 +  𝛽15 𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑃 ∗ 𝐵𝐶𝑂𝑁 
+  𝑒                                                                                 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (2) 
The model in Equation (1) and (2) estimate the relationship between non-performing loans and financial 
development after controlling for bank-level determinants and the structure of the banking sector, using the first 
dataset.  
For the regional dataset, the data for banking crisis, foreign bank presence, and banking sector concentration 
variables are not available; therefore, we adjust the model which is re-specified below in Equation as: 
𝑁𝑃𝐿 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐶𝐼 +  𝛽2 𝐿𝐷 +  𝛽3 𝑁𝐼𝐼 +  𝛽4 𝐶𝐴𝑅 +  𝛽5 𝐿𝐿𝐶 +  𝛽6 𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽7 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃 
+  𝛽8 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 +  𝛽9 𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑅 +  𝛽10 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃 ∗ 𝐿𝐷 +  𝛽11 𝐶𝐼 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 
+  𝑒                                                                                                      𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (3) 
We control for five determinants that potentially influence the level of non-performing loans at bank-level. The 
first determinant is cost to income ratio (CI) which reflects bank efficiency. Efficient banks tend to report fewer 
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non-performing loans compared to inefficient banks (Louzis et al, 2012; Abd Karim et al, 2010); accordingly, 
we expect that countries with efficient banking sectors should have fewer aggregate non-performing loans.  
The second determinant is loan to deposit ratio (LD), measuring bank liquidity (Van den End, 2016). A too high 
ratio indicates that banks have liquidity problems, and liquidity difficulties of banks are positively correlated 
with non-performing loans. Accordingly, at country-level we expect that banking sectors with liquidity 
problems should have fewer non-performing loans; hence, a positive association between aggregate NPL and 
banking sector liquidity is expected. 
The third determinant is non-interest income to total income (NII) ratio (Smith et al, 2003; DeYoung and Rice, 
2004). Banks that have significant exposure in non-interest source of income should have fewer non-performing 
loans because they rely less on interest income derived from bank lending. Similarly, at country-level we expect 
that banking sectors with higher NII ratio should have fewer non-performing loans. We therefore expect a 
negative relation between NPL and NII.  
The fourth determinant is regulatory capital (CAR). Compared to Boudriga et al (2009) and Klein (2013), we 
use risk-adjusted capital ratio and expect that banks with higher regulatory capital should have fewer non-
performing loans because banks’ risk-adjusted capital should limit banks from risky lending that would 
otherwise lead to higher non-performing loans and reduced profitability (Ozili, 2017). At country-level, we also 
expect that banking sectors with higher regulatory capital ratios should have fewer non-performing loans, 
implying a negative relationship between NPL and CAR. 
The fifth determinant is the coverage ratio (LLC) measured as loan loss provisions to non-performing loans. A 
high LLC ratio indicates that bank provisions is sufficient to protect banks from losses arising from rising non-
performing loans (Ozili and Outa, 2017); therefore, banks with higher coverage ratios should be able to mitigate 
problems arising from losses associated with non-performing loans, hence, we expect a negative relationship 
between NPL and LLC. 
Next, we incorporate three financial (sector) development indicators into the model: (i) size of banking sector 
(DGDP) measured as bank deposit to GDP ratio (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000); (ii) extent of financial 
intermediation (PGDP) measured as private credit by domestic banks to GDP ratio (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2000; Cihak et al, 2012) and (iii) foreign bank presence (FOREIGN) reflecting financial development 
via financial liberation measured as the ratio of foreign bank assets to total banking assets in the domestic 
country (Hermes and Lensink, 2004; Giannetti and Ongena, 2009). Foreign bank presence can mitigate 
connected-lending problems and improve capital allocation by channelling funds to high quality borrowers that 
are able to repay, thereby reducing the risk of non-performing loans (Giannetti and Ongena, 2009); therefore, we 
expect a negative relationship between NPL and FOREIGN. 
Next, we incorporate four financial structure indicators into the model: banking competitiveness, bank stability, 
banking concentration and banking crisis indicators. Banking competitiveness is measured by the Lerner index, 
and banks in highly competitive environments will take deliberate steps to minimise bank risks including non-
performing loans in order to gain a favourable risk management perception from investors and regulators, 
compared to rival banks (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Jimenez et al, 2013). Following this reasoning, countries 
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with a more competitive banking sector should experience fewer non-performing loans. On the other hand, 
excessive competition can compel banks to engage in risky lending practices such as reducing their loan 
screening procedures and using lax lending criteria which in turn would increase the likelihood of generating 
higher non-performing loans (Manove et al, 2001; Bolt and Tieman, 2004). Given the two competing arguments, 
we do not have a definite prediction for the association between competition and non-performing loans.  
Banking stability is commonly measured by the z-score index in the literature, defined as the ratio of the return 
on assets plus the capital ratio divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets (Laeven and Levine, 
2009; Foos et al, 2009; Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). Higher Z-score values indicate increased banking 
stability and we expect that stable banking sectors should have fewer non-performing loans, implying a negative 
relationship between NPL and the STABILITY variable.  
Also, we control for banking concentration but we do not have a definite prediction for this variable. We also 
control for banking crises, and expect countries to have higher non-performing loans when they experience 
major financial/economic crises. The correlation matrix in Panel C shows that multicollinearity is not an issue in 
the analyses. Finally, the model is estimated using the panel OLS regression
3
 with country and year fixed effects 
applied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 We also estimate the model using dynamic panel GMM regression and find results that are not statistically meaningful for 
the analysis; therefore, we exclude the results from the main analysis and base our inference from the fixed effect OLS 
regression results. The GMM regression is shown in Appendix A2.  
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Panel C: Correlation  Table:  
              
              Probability CI LD NII CAR NPL LLC DGDP PGDP CRISIS BCON STABILITY FOREIGN LERNER 
CI 1.000             
              
              
LD -0.068 1.000            
 0.162             
              
NII 0.330*** -0.109** 1.000           
 0.000 0.025            
              
CAR 0.081* -0.178*** 0.119** 1.000          
 0.097 0.000 0.013           
              
NPL 0.0212 -0.142*** 0.072 0.176*** 1.000         
 0.662 0.003 0.140 0.000          
              
LLC 0.057 -0.021 0.029 0.042 -0.175*** 1.000        
 0.234 0.666 0.548 0.394 0.000         
              
DGDP -0.239*** -0.171*** -0.041 -0.173*** -0.190*** -0.186*** 1.000       
 0.000 0.000 0.395 0.000 0.000 0.000        
              
PGDP -0.218*** 0.374*** -0.077 -0.361*** -0.244*** -0.174*** 0.618*** 1.000      
 0.000 0.000 0.115 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000       
              
CRISIS 0.081* 0.140*** 0.038 -0.159*** 0.034 -0.187*** 0.226*** 0.4046*** 1.000     
 0.095 0.004 0.432 0.001 0.483 0.000 0.000 0.000      
              
BCON -0.042 0.019 0.113** 0.008 -0.031 -0.074 0.061 0.281*** 0.109** 1.000    
 0.385 0.690 0.019 0.874 0.518 0.129 0.209 0.000 0.024     
              
STABILITY -0.126** -0.059 -0.107** 0.051 -0.112** 0.054 0.325*** 0.149*** -0.088* 0.092* 1.000   
 0.009 0.221 0.026 0.294 0.021 0.266 0.000 0.002 0.068 0.057    
              
FOREIGN 0.119** -0.212*** 0.007 0.144*** 0.073 -0.131*** -0.066 -0.319*** -0.153*** -0.018 -0.212*** 1.000  
 0.014 0.000 0.884 0.003 0.130 0.007 0.173 0.000 0.002 0.704 0.000   
              
LERNER -0.427*** -0.128*** -0.196*** 0.264*** -0.033 0.109** 0.042 -0.091* -0.313*** 0.002 0.179*** 0.012 1.000 
 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.502 0.023 0.391 0.061 0.000 0.965 0.000 0.805  
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4. Empirical Results 
Section 4.1 presents the regression results using the first-sample dataset consisting of 96 countries while Section 
4.2 presents the regression results using the regional dataset  
4.1. Pooled Country Sample: Results 
Column 1 of Table 1 reports the regression result for the association between non-performing loans and 
financial development. CI coefficient is negatively significant, indicating that NPLs are inversely associated 
with bank efficiency, implying that countries with efficient banking systems have fewer non-performing loans, 
and this result supports the finding of Louzis et al (2012). LLC coefficient is also negatively significant 
indicating an inverse association between NPL and bank loan loss coverage ratio, implying that banks in 
countries with higher loan loss coverage ratio have fewer non-performing loans because they are better 
protected against losses arising from problem loans.  
PGDP coefficient is positively significant, and indicates a positive association between NPL and financial 
intermediation, implying that banking sectors with greater financial intermediation activities have more NPLs. 
CRISIS coefficient is positively significant as expected, and implies that countries that experience major 
banking crises have high non-performing loans. BCON coefficient is positively significant, and implies that 
countries with concentrated banking systems have higher non-performing loans. STABILITY coefficient is 
negatively significant; and implies that aggregate NPLs are lower in countries with stable banking systems. 
LERNER coefficient is negatively significant, and indicates that countries with competitive banking systems 
have fewer non-performing loans. FOREIGN coefficient is positively significant and indicates that higher NPLs 
are associated with banking sectors with greater foreign bank assets, which of course, implies that countries with 
greater foreign bank presence have higher non-performing loans. CAR coefficient reports a positive sign but is 
statistically insignificant. 
Next, we separately regress NPL against its bank-level determinants only. Column 2 of Table 1 reports the 
results. All the variables are significant while LLC coefficient remains negatively significant, consistent with the 
earlier findings in Column 1. Also, we separately regress NPL on each financial development and structure 
indicator and exclude the bank-level determinants. Column 3 of Table 1 reports the results. PGDP and 
FOREIGN remain positively significant, confirming the earlier result in Column 1. Also, CRISIS, BCON, 
STABILITY and LERNER coefficients are all significant except DGDP, confirming the earlier results in 
Column 1.  
4.2. Robustness 
4.2.1. Interaction Analysis 
From hindsight, we expect some complementarity requiring some interaction analysis.  
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First, we expect countries with highly-liquid banking sectors to have greater financial intermediation activities 
and thus should have little or no need for government funding. We therefore check whether non-performing 
loans are significantly fewer or higher in countries whose banking sectors are liquid and have greater financial 
intermediation. To do this, we interact NPL variable with the loan to deposit ratio (liquidity indicator) and 
private credit by bank to GDP ratio (financial intermediation indicator) variables. Column 4 of Table 1 reports 
the result. LD*PGDP coefficient is insignificant to draw any meaningful inference.  
Next, we expect that countries that have efficient banking sectors and greater stability should have fewer non-
performing loans. We test for this complementarity by interacting NPL with bank efficiency ratio (CI) and the 
stability indicator. Column 5 of Table 1 reports the result. CI*STABILITY coefficient is surprisingly positively 
significant contrary to our expectation, and imply that non-performing loans are positively associated with 
efficient and stable banking sectors. Further, we test for potential complementarity between banking sector 
concentration and the size of the banking sector because a large banking sector in several countries may be 
dominated by few large banks (hence, greater concentration). We test whether this complementarity has any 
significant impact on non-performing loan. We interact NPL with the banking concentration indicator (BCON) 
and banking sector size indicator (DGDP) which is bank deposit to GDP ratio. Column 6 of Table 1 reports the 
result. BCON*DGDP coefficient is statistically insignificant. 
4.2.2. Pooled Regional Results 
Next, we introduce the second dataset into the analysis. A look at the regional dataset show that data for banking 
crisis, foreign bank presence, and banking sector concentration variables are not available, hence, the model is 
re-specified in Equation 3 in Section 3.2. Column 7 of Table 1 reports the regression result. LD coefficient is 
negatively significant, and indicates that NPLs are inversely associated with bank liquidity, implying that 
banking sectors with higher liquidity have fewer non-performing. CAR coefficient is also negatively significant 
indicating an inverse association between NPLs and regulatory capital, implying that banks in countries with 
higher regulatory capital ratios have fewer non-performing loans. The coefficient of the remaining variables are 
insignificant while LD*PGDP and CI*STABILITY coefficients are also insignificant in column 8 and 9. 
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Table 1: Non-performing loans and Financial Development 
 Pooled Country Sample Regression Pooled Regional Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
c 9.074** 
(2.55) 
-0.807 
(-0.42) 
-0.473 
(-0.17) 
8.438** 
(2.15) 
11.543*** 
(3.22) 
6.901* 
(1.79) 
37.127*** 
(3.61) 
38.254*** 
(3.67) 
41.312*** 
(2.68) 
CI -0.105*** 
(-4.64) 
0.037** 
(1.94) 
 -0.104*** 
(-4.58) 
-0.169*** 
(-5.95) 
-0.101*** 
(-4.42) 
-0.171 
(-1.58) 
-0.174 
(-1.60) 
-0.249 
(-1.04) 
LD -0.010 
(-0.88) 
0.023** 
(2.47) 
 -0.005 
(-0.26) 
-0.011 
(-0.97) 
-0.013 
(-1.10) 
-0.126** 
(-2.38) 
-0.201* 
(-1.88) 
-0.127** 
(-2.36) 
NII -0.024 
(-1.02) 
0.045** 
(2.51) 
 -0.024 
(-1.03) 
-0.042* 
(-1.77) 
-0.026 
(-1.08) 
-0.102 
(-0.63) 
-0.055 
(-0.31) 
-0.095 
(-0.57) 
CAR 0.107 
(1.55) 
0.214*** 
(3.57) 
 0.112 
(1.60) 
0.152** 
(2.22) 
0.108 
(1.57) 
-0.786*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.667** 
(-2.09) 
-0.784*** 
(-2.76) 
LLC -0.022*** 
(-3.26) 
-0.030*** 
(-5.49) 
 -0.022*** 
(-3.19) 
-0.022*** 
(-3.37) 
-0.021*** 
(-3.16) 
-0.047 
(-1.13) 
-0.054 
(-1.32) 
-0.048 
(-1.15) 
DGDP -0.009 
(-0.36) 
 0.006 
(0.32) 
-0.011 
(-0.42) 
-0.014 
(-0.54) 
0.024 
(0.69) 
0.214 
(1.34) 
0.243 
(1.48) 
0.207 
(1.28) 
PGDP 0.068** 
(2.17) 
 0.064*** 
(2.89) 
0.076** 
(2.02) 
0.077** 
(2.50) 
0.077** 
(2.42) 
0.144 
(1.01) 
-0.078 
(-0.25) 
0.150 
(1.04) 
CRISIS 1.569** 
(2.12) 
 1.794*** 
(2.86) 
1.651** 
(2.15) 
1.209* 
(1.65) 
1.567** 
(2.12) 
   
BCON 0.058** 
(2.39) 
 0.059** 
(2.53) 
0.058** 
(2.37) 
0.055** 
(2.29) 
0.102*** 
(2.62) 
   
STABILITY -0.223** 
(-2.42) 
 -0.159** 
(-2.03) 
-0.225** 
(-2.43) 
-0.716*** 
(-4.38) 
-0.231** 
(-2.51) 
-0.121 
(-0.58) 
-0.065 
(-0.29) 
-0.454 
(-0.49) 
FOREIGN 0.059** 
(2.47) 
 0.038* 
(1.63) 
0.059** 
(2.42) 
0.068*** 
(2.86) 
0.062** 
(2.56) 
   
LERNER -12.351*** 
(-5.29) 
 -0.568*** 
(-4.59) 
-12.294*** 
(-5.25) 
-10.726*** 
(-4.59) 
-12.458*** 
(-5.34) 
-4.236 
(-0.45) 
-3.875 
(-0.41) 
-5.622 
(-0.55) 
LD*PGDP    -0.0001 
(-0.39) 
   0.003 
(0.80) 
 
CI*STABILITY     0.009*** 
(3.63) 
   0.007 
(0.37) 
BCON*DGDP      -0.001 
(-1.44) 
   
Country 
 Fixed Effect? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
 Fixed Effect? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 82.40 65.19 80.91 82.41 83.08 82.51 88.71 88.91 88.75 
Adjusted R² 77.37 60.09 76.17 77.32 78.18 77.45 80.97 80.77 80.48 
F-statistic 16.39 12.786 17.09 16.18 16.95 16.29 11.457 10.91 10.733 
Observations 424 862 464 424 424 424 60 60 60 
Column (1)-(6) report regression result for 96 countries for the 2003 to 2014 period and the countries included in the analysis are reported in Appendix A1. Column (7)-(9) 
report regional regression result for 5 major regions of the world for the 2003 to 2014 period and the regions included in the analysis are reported in Appendix A1 namely Sub-
Saharan Africa (developing countries only); Middle East and North Africa (developing countries only); Latin America and Caribbean (developing countries only); Europe and 
Central Asia (developing countries only); East Asian and pacific (developing countries only). T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels. Regression includes country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are not clustered. CI = cost to income ratio, representing bank efficiency. LD = bank 
loan to bank deposit ratio, representing banking sector liquidity. NII = Non-interest income to total income ratio, representing bank profit from non-loan sources. CAR = ratio 
of regulatory capital to risk-weight assets, representing regulatory capital. LLC = loan loss coverage measured as loan loss provisions to non-performing loan ratio, represents 
the ability of bank provisions to protect banks from losses arising from rising non-performing. DGDP = bank deposit to GDP ratio, representing the size of the banking sector. 
PGDP = private credit by banks to GDP ratio, representing the extent of financial Intermediation. CRISIS = dummy variable that takes the value 1 for countries that had 
experienced a major banking crisis, and 0 otherwise. BCON = banking concentration. STABILITY = Z-score indicator. FOREIGN = foreign bank assets to total banking asset, 
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representing foreign bank presence. LERNER = banking competitiveness. 
 
 
4.2.3. Additional Test 
We also estimate the model using dynamic panel GMM regression and find results that are not statistically 
meaningful for the analysis; therefore, we exclude the results from the main analysis and base our inference 
from the fixed effect OLS regression results. The GMM regression is shown in Appendix A2 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of the study is to investigate the influence of financial development on non-performing loans. In 
the pooled country analysis, we find that foreign bank presence and financial development (i.e. private credit by 
banks to GDP ratio) is positive and significantly associated with non-performing loans, implying that non-
performing loans increases with greater financial development that take the form of greater foreign bank 
presence and greater financial intermediation. This could be due to weak supervision of the lending standards of 
all banks and non-bank financial institutions actively involved in the financial intermediation process. Weak 
supervision encourage financial institutions to engage in lax lending standards which subsequently gives rise to 
non-performing loans particularly when abnormal events sets in that affect borrowers’ ability to repay.  
National bank regulators/supervisor should not only take into account the role that financial development 
structures play in influencing aggregate non-performing loans but should also ensure that thorough supervision 
of the lending practices of banks is in place as well as the active monitoring of the financial intermediation 
process in the country. Among the determinants of non-performing loans, bank efficiency, loan loss coverage 
ratio, competition and banking system stability are inversely associated with NPLs while NPLs are positively 
associated with banking crises and bank concentration. For the regional sample, the graphical analysis show that 
NPLs are negatively related to financial development while the empirical analysis do not show any significant 
relationship although NPLs are observed to be significantly associated with regulatory capital ratios and bank 
liquidity, implying that banking sectors with greater regulatory capital and liquidity experience fewer NPLs.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A1: Non-performing loans (Trend) 
S/N Country Pre-Financial Crisis Crisis Post-Financial Crisis 
S/N Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1 Algeria       21.1 18.3 14.4 11.7 10.6 9.2 
2 Argentina 17.7 10.7 5.2 3.4 2.7 3.1 3.5 2.1 1.4 1.7 1.7 2 
3 Australia 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.3 2 2.1 2 1.8 1.5 1.1 
4 Austria 3 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.2 1.9 2.3 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.5 
5 Bahrain      2.3 3.9 5.1 4.9 5.8 5.6 4.6 
6 Bangladesh 22.1 17.5       5.8 9.7 8.6 9.4 
7 Belarus 3.7 2.8 3.1 2.8 1.9 1.7 4.2 3.5 4.2 5.5 4.4 4.4 
8 Belgium 2.6 2.3 2 1.7 1.4 1.7 3.1 2.8 3.3 3.8 4.3 4.4 
9 Bolivia 16.7 14 11.3 8.7 5.6 4.3 3.5 2.2 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 
10 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
8.4 6.1 5.3 4 3 3.1 5.9 11.4 11.8 13.5 15.1 14 
11 Botswana          2.6 3.6 4.1 
12 Brazil 4.1 2.9 3.5 3.5 3 3.1 4.2 3.1 3.5 3.4 2.9 2.9 
13 Bulgaria 3.2 2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.4 6.4 11.9 15 16.6 16.9 16.7 
14 Burundi        9.4 7.4 8.2 9.9 10.9 
15 Cameroon        10.1 11.4 11.6 10.3 9.7 
16 Canada 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
17 Chile 1.6 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.8 1 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 
18 China 20.4 13.2 8.6 7.1 6.2 2.4 1.6 1.1 1 1 1 1.2 
19 Colombia 6.8 3.3 2.7 2.7 3.2 3.9 4 2.9 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.9 
20 Congo, Rep.        1 1.1 1.5 1.2 2.5 
21 Costa Rica 1.7 2 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.5 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 
22 Croatia 8.9 7.5 6.2 5.2 4.8 4.9 7.7 11.1 12.3 13.8 15.4 16.7 
23 Cyprus      3.6 4.5 5.8 10 18.4 38.6 44.9 
24 Czech Republic 4.9 4 3.9 3.6 2.4 2.8 4.6 5.4 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.6 
25 Denmark 0.8 0.7 0.2  0.6 1.2 3.3 4.1 3.7 6 4.6 4.4 
26 Djibouti       9.3 8.3 9.4 11.4 14.5 18 
27 East Asia & Pacific 
(developing only) 
13.9 11.9 9.1 7.5 6.35 4.6 3.55 3.4 2.75 2.3 2.3 2.1 
28 Egypt, Arab Rep. 24.2 23.6 26.5 18.2 19.3 14.8 13.4 13.6 10.9 9.8 9.3 8.9 
29 Europe & Central 
Asia (developing 
only) 
7.35 6.3 3.8 3.5 3 4.2 7.15 10.2 9.85 9.8 11.6 12.4 
30 Finland 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5   
31 France 4.8 4.2 3.5 3 2.7 2.8 4 3.8 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.2 
25 
 
32 Gabon 13.9 16 14.1 10.7 7.6 8.5 7.2 9.9 4.4 3.4 3.5  
33 Georgia 2.4 2 3.8 0.8 0.8 4.1 6.3 5.9 4.5 3.7 3 3 
34 Germany 5.2 4.9 4.1 3.4 2.7 2.9 3.3 3.2 3 2.9 2.7 2.3 
35 Ghana 18.3 16.3 13 7.9 6.4 7.7 16.2 17.6 14.1 13.2 12 11.3 
36 Greece 7 7 6.3 5.4 4.6 4.7 7 9.1 14.4 23.3 31.9 33.8 
37 Grenada      3.46 5.9 7.6 9.4 11.8 13.8 14.6 
38 Guatemala 6.5 7.1 2.4 2.3 1.6 2.2 2.7 2.1 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.3 
39 Honduras    4 3.1 4.3 4.7 3.7 2.9 3.3 3.4 3.3 
40 Hong Kong SAR, 
China 
3.9 2.3 1.4 1.1 0.8 1.2 1.6 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 
41 Hungary 2.6 1.8 2.3 2.6 2.3 3 8.2 10 13.7 16 16.8 15.6 
42 Iceland 2.1 0.9 1.1 0.8   14.1 18.3 11.6 6.3 4.3  
43 India 8.8 7.2 5.2 3.5 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.4 4 4.3 
44 Indonesia 6.8 4.5 7.6 6.1 4 3.2 3.3 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.7 2.1 
45 Ireland 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.9 9.8 13 16.1 25 25.7 20.7 
46 Israel 2.6 2.5 2.3 2 1.5 1.5 1.4 3.1 3.4 3.5 2.9 2.2 
47 Italy 6.7 6.6 5.3 6.6 5.8 6.3 9.4 10 11.7 13.7 16.5 17.3 
48 Japan 5.2 2.9 1.8 1.8 1.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 1.9 
49 Jordan 15.5 10.3 6.6 4.3 4.1 4.2 6.7 8.2 8.5 7.7 7 5.6 
50 Kenya 34.9 29.3   10.6 8.8 8 6.3 4.4 4.6 5 5.5 
51 Korea, Rep. 2.6 1.9 1.2 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 
52 Latin America & 
Caribbean 
(developing only) 
6.65 4.85 3.1 3.3 2.7 3.1 3.7 3 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.6 
53 Lebanon  17.7 16.4 13.5 10.1 7.5 6 4.3 3.8 3.8 4 4 
54 Lesotho  1 3 3 3 1.8 3 3 2.1 2.5 3.7  
55 Luxembourg 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2  
56 Macedonia 22.4 17 15 11.2 7.5 6.7 8.9 9 9.5 10.1 10.9 10.8 
57 Malaysia 13.9 11.7 9.4 8.5 6.5 4.8 3.6 3.4 2.7 2 1.8 1.6 
58 Malta  6.5 7.4 5.9 5.9 5.5 5.8 7 7.1 7.8 8.9 9 
59 Mauritania        45.3 39.2 25.7 20.4  
60 Mauritius    3 2.5 2 3.3 2.8 2.8 3.6 4.2 4.9 
61 Mexico 3.2 2.5 1.5 1.8 2.3 3 2.8 2 2.1 2.4 3.2 3 
62 Middle East & North 
Africa (developing 
only) 
21.45 19.4 16.4 12.2 9 7.5 11.25 10.65 10.15 10.6 9.95 9.05 
63 Morocco 18.7 19.4 15.7 10.9 7.9 6 5.5 4.8 4.8 5 5.9 6.9 
64 Mozambique 14.4 5.9 3.5 3.1 2.6 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.6 3.2 2.3 3.3 
65 Namibia 3.9 2.4 2.3 2.6 2.8 3.1 2.7 2 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.5 
66 Netherlands 2 1.5    1.7 3.2 2.8 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.1 
67 New Zealand     0.3 0.9 1.7 2.1 1.7 1.4 1 0.9 
68 Nigeria 20.5 21.6  9.3 9.5 6.3 37.3 20.1 5.8 3.7 3.4 3 
69 Norway 1.6 1 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.7 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.1 
70 Paraguay 20.6 10.8 6.5 3.3 1.3 1.1 1.6 1.3 1.7 2.1 2 1.8 
71 Peru 14.8 9.5 6.3 4.1 2.7 2.2 2.7 3 2.9 3.2 3.5 4 
26 
 
72 Philippines 16.1 14.4 10 7.5 5.8 4.6 3.5 3.4 2.6 2.2 2.4 2 
73 Poland 21.2 14.9 11 7.4 5.2 2.8 4.3 4.9 4.7 5.2 5 4.8 
74 Portugal 2.4 2 1.5  2.8 3.6 4.8 5.2 7.5 9.8 10.6 11.9 
75 Qatar      1.2 1.7 2 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.7 
76 Romania 8.3 8.1 1.4 1.8 2.6 2.7 7.9 11.9 14.3 18.2 21.9 13.9 
77 Rwanda 33 31 29 25 16.9 12.6 13.1 11.3 8.2 6 7 5.2 
78 Senegal 13.3 12.6 11.9 16.8 18.6 17.4 18.7 20.2 16.2 18.4 19.1 20.3 
79 Seychelles    4.4 2.3 2 3.8 5.5 8.1 9 9.2 8 
80 Sierra Leone 7.4 16.5 26.8 26.9 25.6 17.9 10.6 15.6 15.1 14.7 22.4 33.4 
81 Singapore 6.7 5 3.8 2.8 1.5 1.4 2 1.4 1.1 1 0.9 0.8 
82 Slovenia 3.7 3 2.5   4.2 5.8 8.2 11.8 15.2 13.3 11.7 
83 South Africa 2.4 1.8 1.8 1.1 1.4 3.9 5.9 5.8 4.7 4 3.6 3.2 
84 Spain 1 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.9 2.8 4.1 4.7 6 7.5 9.4 8.5 
85 Sri Lanka         3.8 3.6 5.6 4.2 
86 Sub-Saharan Africa 13.6 12.6 7 7.7 6.95 6.95 7.6 8.6 5.6 4.6 5.1 5.2 
87 Swaziland 2 7.2 7 7.7 7.5 7.6 8.6 7.8 7.5 9.7 6.8 6.9 
88 Sweden 1.9 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.2 
89 Switzerland 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.9 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 
90 Tanzania        7.8 5.4 6.4 5.1 6.6 
91 Thailand 13.5 11.9 9.1 8.1 7.9 5.7 5.2 3.9 2.9 2.4 2.3 2.3 
92 Tunisia 24.2 23.6 20.9    13.2 13 13.3 14.9 15.2 15.8 
93 Turkey 11.5 6.5 5 3.9 3.3 3.4 5 3.5 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.7 
94 Uganda 7.2 2.2 2.3 2.9 4.1 2.2 4.2 2.1 2.2 4.2 5.6 4.1 
95 Ukraine 28.3 30 5.6 4 3 3.9 13.7 15.3 14.7 16.5 12.9 19 
96 United Arab 
Emirates 
14.3 12.5 8.3 6.4 2.6 2.3 4.3 5.6 7.2 8.4 7.3 6.5 
97 United Kingdom 2.5 1.9 1 0.9 0.9 1.6 3.5 4 4 3.6 3.1 1.8 
98 United States 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.4 3 5 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.5 1.9 
99 Uruguay 14.3 4.7 5.6 3.7 1.1 1 3.8 2.4 1.5 1.3 1.3  
100 Vietnam      2.2 1.8 2.1 2.8 3.4   
101 World 5.75 4.2 3.5 3.1 2.7 3 4.3 4.55 4.1 4.1 4.4 4.35 
102 Yemen, Rep.      18 13.9 17.7 21.2 25.5 21.7 24.7 
103 Zambia        14.8 10.4 8.1 7  
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A2: Non-performing loans and Financial Development 
We also estimate the model using dynamic panel GMM regression and find results that are not statistically meaningful for 
the analysis; therefore, we exclude the results from the main analysis and base our inference from the fixed effect OLS 
regression results. The GMM regression is shown in Appendix A2 
Pooled Country-Sample GMM Result 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
NPLt-1 0.589*** 
(8.89) 
0.582*** 
(7.635) 
0.518*** 
(-11.51) 
0.655*** 
(8.21) 
0.596*** 
(8.78) 
0.614*** 
(8.90) 
CI -0.062 
(-1.17) 
0.005 
(1.08) 
 -0.075 
(-1.44) 
-0.045 
(-0.51) 
-0.055 
(-1.06) 
LD 0.045 
(0.95) 
0.046*** 
(7.74) 
 0.144 
(1.51) 
0.059 
(1.08) 
0.067 
(1.09) 
NII -0.017 
(-0.16) 
0.059*** 
(6.21) 
 -0.059 
(-0.55) 
-0.005 
(-0.05) 
-0.063 
(-0.54) 
CAR 0.064 
(0.42) 
0.153*** 
(7.75) 
 0.096 
(0.60) 
0.084 
(0.37) 
0.115 
(0.63) 
LLC 0.037 
(1.56) 
-0.038*** 
(-8.03) 
 0.020 
(0.74) 
0.035 
(1.47) 
0.036 
(1.47) 
DGDP -0.096 
(-0.72) 
 -0.247*** 
(-3.79) 
-0.082 
(-0.63) 
-0.081 
(-0.57) 
-0.012 
(-0.06) 
PGDP 0.200 
(1.41) 
 0.319*** 
(3.93) 
0.291* 
(1.86) 
0.178 
(1.16) 
0.139 
(0.81) 
CRISIS -2.085 
(-0.76) 
 -1.601 
(-0.84) 
-1.173 
(-0.40) 
-1.608 
(-0.58) 
-1.853 
(-0.65) 
BCON 0.225*** 
(3.38) 
 0.182*** 
(4.35) 
0.249*** 
(3.64) 
0.219*** 
(2.98) 
0.352* 
(1.87) 
STABILITY 0.032 
(0.11) 
 -0.494*** 
(-3.33) 
0.072 
(0.26) 
0.130 
(0.34) 
0.068 
(0.23) 
FOREIGN -0.141 
(-1.38) 
 -0.113* 
(-1.69) 
-0.081 
(-0.74) 
-0.171 
(-1.54) 
-0.108 
(-0.95) 
LERNER -30.77*** 
(-5.92) 
 -25.59*** 
(-7.29) 
-31.89*** 
(-5.92) 
-30.91*** 
(-5.78) 
-34.83*** 
(-4.25) 
LD*PGDP    -0.001 
(-1.20) 
  
CI*STABILITY     -0.003 
(-0.37) 
 
BCON*DGDP      -0.002 
(-0.73) 
Country 
 Fixed Effect? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
 Fixed Effect? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
J-statistic 12.71 50.44 20.95 11.34 12.86 12.65 
P(J-statistic) 0.625 0.416 0.399 0.658 0.538 0.554 
Observations 332 683 364 332 332 332 
Column (1)-(6) report regression result for 96 countries for the 2003 to 2014 period and the countries included in the 
analysis are reported in Appendix A1. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5% and 10% 
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significance levels. GMM first-difference regression. Regression includes country first-difference and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are not clustered.  
 
 
 
 
 
A3: Data description and source 
Indicator  Indicator Name Source 
BCON Bank concentration Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
CI Bank cost to income ratio, measuring efficiency. Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
LD Bank credit to bank deposits ratio, measuring banking 
sector liquidity. 
Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
DGDP Bank deposits to GDP ratio, measuring size of 
banking sector 
Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
NPL Bank nonperforming loans to gross loans ratio Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
NII Bank noninterest income to total income ratio, 
measuring bank profitability from non-loan sources 
Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
CAR Bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets ratio, 
measuring bank capital regulation  
Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
CRISIS Banking crisis dummy (1=banking crisis, 0=none) Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
FOREIGN Foreign bank assets among total bank assets ratio, 
measuring financial liberalisation  
Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
LERNER Lerner index, measuring competition Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
LLC Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio, measuring 
loan loss coverage ratio 
Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
PGDP Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP ratio, 
measuring extent of financial intermediation 
Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
STABILITY Bank Z-score, measuring banking stability Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
 
